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1. Introduction1
The main goal of this background analysis is to identify operational strategies used by organised 
crime (OC) to tamper with public procurement, in particular with transnational major works of 
construction. The allocation of public funds and the execution of public works are two of the legal 
sectors mainly engaged by OC and corruption. In order to develop effective counter-strategies to 
fight against these phenomena it is essential to understand how various criminal groups try to 
infiltrate public bidding and/or to control the execution of public works. 
This background analysis also aims at giving the researchers, who will fill the questionnaire of 
the second part of WOC Project, useful and common tools of work. For a right implementation 
of the Work Stream 3, a common understanding among researchers on what characterises the 
phenomenon of criminal infiltration in public procurement and on the meaning of organised crime is 
very important.
 
To analyse such issues secondary resources have been used which are made up of the academic 
literature in these fields and other documents, such as reports by national and international 
institutions2 and on-going projects3.
2. Organised Crime definition and research perspectives
Before analysing the main issue of this working paper, it is important to clarify the meaning of 
organised crime adopted for the present research. In fact, a common level of understanding among 
scholars on the meaning and constitution of organised crime is still missing. This is due to various 
reasons: (a) several disciplines (such as law and criminal justice, criminology, international relations, 
sociology) deal with OC and discuss its definition according to their specific interests and focus; (b) OC 
is conceptualised around the world in different ways, using various cultural points of reference; (c) OC 
1 Valeria Ferraris: paras. 3, 6; Caterina Mazza: paras. 1, 2, 4, 5,7
2 Institutions include EU Parliament; EU Commission; Transparency International; Greco; Europol; Italian Parliament; Direzione 
Nazionale
3 The on-going projects include www.ocportfolio.eu; www.arielproject.eu; www.ebocs.eu; www.bownet.eu; EU survey to access 
the level and the impact of crimes against business HOME/ 2010/ISEC/PR/042-A2; C.A.P.A.C.I. Project www.interno.gov.it.
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3is a label that identifies and includes a whole range of different crimes and groups; (d) the legal-illegal 
nexus as a characterising element of organised crime is still under-studied. In fact, a sizeable part of 
scholars focuses the attention on illegal activities carried out by OC groups, avoiding (or marginally 
considering) the issue of criminal infiltration in legal markets (Lavorgna and Sergi, 2013; Tenti, 2012; 
Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014).
The approaches used by academics to analyse and to define the phenomenon of organised crime 
are various too, van Dijck has identified three of such perspectives as the main significant elements 
to understand the points of view adopted by scholars. The author underlines that several existing 
definitions were thought of serving quite different purposes. The three main approaches are: the 
lexical approach, the essentialist approach and the formalist approach (van Dijck, 2007).
The lexical approach focuses on the meaning of the single words: organised and crime. The analysis 
had followed the Aristotelian criterion for which the phenomena definitions are construed as having 
three parts: species, genus and distinctive criterion. According to this formula, the phenomena are 
divided in categories including various types of sub-groups with specific characteristics. 
This approach allows to identify OC as a crime that is organised. The academics who follow this 
approach focus their attention on the type and structural level of the criminal organisation. 
Among others, van Duyne and Maltz have defined OC in terms of the organisational degree of 
criminal conduct (van Dijck, 2007, p. 72). According to other authors (Armao, 2003, pp. 25-27) 
it is important to specify the substantial differences existing among various types of criminal 
organisations (such as street gangs, mafia, and so on), each one characterised by a specific level 
of criminal specialisation. This conceptual representation includes several kinds of criminal groups 
which can be laid out on a continuum, starting from organised crime thought of as a combination 
of individuals who commit a series of felonies; then proceeding on to crime syndicates as well-
structured groups which aim to profit economically; and, at the end of this climax, mafia groups that 
are the most specialised criminal organisations which seek also political control of the territory.
The essentialist approach has produced definitions containing components which together and 
exclusively are regarded as the necessary distinctive features of criminal organisations (van Dijck, 
2007, p. 73). These components are considered as essential and all other aspects are considered 
as additional and not fundamental. This approach only produces descriptions of the observed 
phenomena. However, the essentialist approach is predominant in literature. It is adopted by 
scholars in order to get stipulative definitions with a function inherently limited to the scope of each 
individual research. Each author considers his/her own definition useful for the analysis and to avoid 
misunderstanding on the actual topic examined.
 
The formalist approach defines OC with the aim of clarifying and delimiting borders of issues and 
phenomena. They consist in several criteria, which determine whether a given phenomenon is part 
(or not) of a specific domain. This approach is usually used for empirical research or for operative 
needs. This perspective was adopted for identifying operational definitions, such as the Europol ones 
described in the next paragraph (§ 3).
The expression organised crime was probably first used in an 1896 annual report of the New York 
Society for the Prevention of Crime, which referred to it in relation to gambling and prostitution 
operations. In that period, Woodiwiss underlined that “organised crime had no fixed meaning and 
could be understood only in context” (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014, p. 24). In fact, in Europe as in the USA, 
this concept has been used to refer to very different phenomena, which occur in diverse contexts. As a 
result, over the years a wide variety of different meanings have been attributed to the term organised 
crime. But scholars across the years agree that the expression organised crime incorporates two 
different notions: (a) a criminal organisation, primarily engaged in illegal activities; (b) the provision of 
illegal goods and services. As a matter of fact, all theoretical definitions contain both elements and 
they can be systematized according to them (Varese, 2010; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014, p. 22). 
In 1983 Hagan carried out the first systematic analysis of OC existing definitions. According to it, a 
consensus does exist among all American definitions elaborated in the period between 1969-1981. 
All authors agreed that organised crime primarily involves a continuing enterprise, which pursues 
profit through illegal activities. Such organisations operate continually over time, following rational 
choices and using different means, mainly violence and corruption.
4In 2010, Varese updated Hagan’s review. The author worked on 115 definitions used in the period 
between 1915-2009 and analysed them by considering organisational structure and the criminal 
activities implemented.
Taking into account the type of organisational structure characterising various OC groups, over 
the years the authors have focused on a selected number of peculiarities, primarily specialisation, 
hierarchy, La Cosa Nostra, illegal enterprise, and more recently Networks and harm.
Between the mid-1850s and the 1950s, the term organised crime was mainly used in the USA to 
refer to highly specialised groups for attacks upon persons and property and for defence. 
On the contrary, since the mid-1950s hierarchy attracted the attention of scholars who - in particular 
in the 1960s - identified it as the distinguishing feature of the organised crime structure. 
Along with specialised and hierarchically structured, organised crime, during the 1950s and the 
1960s in the USA, a phenomenon completely equivalent to Mafia came under consideration. 
In that period, both academics and political advisors in great part adopted a mafia-centred view 
of OC. The latter considers that the organisation -variously called the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, or the 
syndicate- constitutes the unique existing organisational structure of OC. Here then, the ethnic 
variable plays a key role in characterising the organised crime phenomenon. For instance, all criminal 
groups are formed by Italians and have the same organisational structure and methods used by 
the Italian mafia. The view that a foreign, an alien nationwide conspiracy was controlling all illegal 
activities in most US cities remained the US official standpoint for almost three decades. 
Since the 1960s, an increasing number of social scientists have discarded the identification of 
organised crime with the mafia. The mafia-centred view was increasingly considered too ideological, 
serving political interests, and without empirical evidence. Most scholars disapproved the elements 
of conspiracy and ethnicity of this approach. As a result, organised crime has been considered a 
business activity (Varese, 2010, p. 5). One of the earliest thinkers of this approach was Smith (1975) 
who expressed the idea that criminals are not a class apart, but rather entrepreneurs who work 
under illegal conditions. Moreover, Smith recognised that a connection between production of goods 
and services and territorial entrenchment exists (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014, p. 28).
As already underlined by Hagan in 1983, scholars agreed on the definition of organised crime as a 
continuing enterprise operating in a rational way to obtain profits through illegal activities. 
The engagement in illegal markets is the fundamental element of any definition in academia and 
among policymakers, particularly in the USA. This aspect unites both the thinkers who endorse the 
mafia-centred view and its critics. Despite this common denominator, academics and politicians 
mainly disagree on how illegal goods and services are provided (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014, p. 29). 
In particular, the thought that the various organised crime groups are rational subjects which act in 
a rational way following codified and certain rules, has been increasingly criticised. In the mid-1980s 
some authors, including Reuter, have undercut the idea that criminal groups wholly control illegal 
business. In particular, Reuter has endorsed the view that criminal enterprises are in competition 
with each other and they are ephemeral. The conditions of illegal business in themselves prevent 
such OC enterprises from growing. The risk of being arrested drives organised crime groups to reduce 
the amount of information available to customers, thus reducing their opportunities to control 
sizeable sectors of illegal markets. Reuter’s analysis was endorsed by Haller. He underlined the 
existence of cooperation among illegal entrepreneurs who remain independent operators, rather 
than joining a hierarchical or monolithic organisation. Partnerships lead an increase in opportunities 
and the sharing of risks and information (Varese, 2010, p. 6).
The illegal enterprise approach, although originating in the US, has acquired a dominant position 
in the European scientific debate (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014, pp. 31-34). During the 1980s and early 
1990s, several academics increasingly considered the economic dimension of OC. In this perspective, 
one of the most important European thinkers is Gambetta who, in the early 1990s, considered OC 
as “an industry which produces, promotes and sells private protection”. His analytical work brings 
to light how entrepreneurial activities of OC are intertwined and combined with the traditional 
political dimension of such associations. Furthermore, other scholars, including Paoli, underline the 
fact that OC groups, and in particular the mafia associations of South Italy, were not only economic 
entrepreneurs aiming at maximising profits, but also groups with several functions which try to 
exercise political control of their territory. 
All definitions of OC 
contain two distinctive 
notions: organisational 
structure and criminal 
activities
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5Other authors, including Arlacchi, have underlined that, following the process of economic 
and cultural modernisation during 1960s, the mafia and organised crime groups have turned 
themselves into entrepreneurs focused on profit accumulation. One of the main consequences of 
such transformation has been the utilisation of mafia methods in the work organisation within the 
companies and for the management of external business. Further, the evidence revealed that OC 
and mafia groups have increasingly undertaken economic activities both in the illegal and in the legal 
world (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2014, p. 32).
Beside the peculiarities of each theoretical position, as in the US, the economic approach in Europe 
has remained unchallenged since the 1970s.
Rather recently, since the 1980s, the concept of networks has emerged for defining and 
understanding the organised crime phenomenon. Several scholars have underlined that various 
types of criminal groups can be thought of as systems based on relational networks (Armao, 2000; 
Allum and Gilmour, 2012; Dino, 2008; Gounev and Ruggiero, 2014, pp. 20-21).
The actors making up these relations are engaged in the process of social networking for the 
provision of illegal goods and services. Within these relational networks, they work in various ways 
and with different roles and tend to extend the social network in itself establishing relations with 
other subjects both criminal and part of the legal world.
The network view captures a flexible order, and structural and hierarchical changes within the 
relational networks. Moreover, “such a framework can account for organisational system ranging 
from simple co-offending partnerships to attempts at monopolising markets and territories, from 
one-time partnerships to membership in quasi-structured organisations, from ties based on family 
to those based on friendship, back group affinities, resource-sharing and so on” (Varese, 2010, p. 8).
Finally, several authors define organised crime by the harm it causes. They think of OC starting from 
its harmful consequences rather than trying to characterise what it is.
Regarding the criminal activities which are an element of organised crime and which are identified by 
various definitions, authors have mainly used the following key words: monopoly, provision of illegal 
goods and services, illegal activities and predation.
Between the 1950s and 1960s, several scholars considered monopoly as one of the main aspects 
characterising organised crime. According to this approach, acting as any other business actor, 
organised crime aims at the exclusivity of each sector of its activities.
The provision of illegal goods and services, as said before, belongs to the economic approach of 
organised crime. Since the 1960s, some authors have considered the economic dimension of 
organised crime as exclusively linked to the activity sectors, and not to the organisational structure of 
such associations. Only a few of them have evaluated criminal activities as wholly predatory. Others 
have argued that they are like a service offered to a part of society.
During the 1970s, scholars have started to endorse the idea that illegal activities and predation 
were the main, almost exclusive, characterising actions of organised crime. In this perspective 
illegal activities are the main organised crime operative field for gaining profits as the key scope 
(Varese, 2010, pp. 8-10). All these activities can variously combine themselves with the different 
organisational structure-based approaches.
Finally, it is worth underlining that almost all theoretical definitions analysed were focused on 
illegal activities carried out by criminal groups, only partially taking into account the organised crime 
involvement in various sectors of the legal world. Maybe the lack of scholars’ attention for criminal 
infiltration in legal sectors of society is due to difficulties in gaining information in this field. But, the 
legal-illegal nexus is an increasingly relevant aspect of organised criminality. Let’s think of white 
collar crimes which involve both the criminal and official world and which give several opportunities 
to organised groups for having access to legitimate economy and to institutional spheres. 
For capturing the legal-illegal nexus, organised crime groups have to be thought of as social 
associations each constituted by a network of relations which operate together with other networks of 
individuals and intertwine themselves with them. In this perspective, organised criminality is more and 
more able to infiltrate legal markets and the official world, thus creating alliances or partnerships (or 
maintaining collusive relations or connivances) with entrepreneurs, politicians, public administrators 
and so on. In this process, illegal activities are invested in the official economy, establishing a closer 
and closer link between the legal and criminal arena. In this scenario, criminals and institutional actors 
are variously engaged in exchanges of favours and entrepreneurial promotions. 
Criminal activities
6This reality seems to be mainly constituted by criminal networks rather than organised crime, which 
involve various actors with different roles and aims (Gounev and Ruggiero, 2012, pp. 7-8). 
3. EU legal definition of Organised Crime
There is not one agreed definition of organised crime in the EU legal or policy texts. The complexity of 
organised crime itself, its evolution across time has resulted in legal definitions, whose only common 
feature is to be too vague and broad.
The Joint Action 98/733/JHA defined a criminal organisation as “a structured association, established 
over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offences 
which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four 
years or a more serious penalty, whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of 
obtaining material benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of public 
authorities”.
According to this definition, a criminal organisation registers the presence of at least three people in 
a group established over a period of time who act in concert in order to commit crimes, punishable 
with at least four years of maximum imprisonment. This definition is very broad and vague, especially 
if one considers how the levels of penalties vary among Member States.
The Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organized 
crime - which repeals the 1998 Joint Action with the aim to change EU legislation according to the 
Palermo Convention - defines criminal organisation as “a structured association, established over 
a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert with a view of committing offences 
which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four 
years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”. 
This clarifies the meaning of structured association as an association that is not randomly formed 
for the immediate commission of an offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its 
members, continuity of its membership, or a developed structure.
The Framework Decision attempts to introduce a specific offence of participation in a criminal 
organisation, which is not limited to a criminal organisation with specific features (more old mafia 
style, highly hierarchical and structured). However, the definition provided does not represent a 
significant improvement compared to that of the Joint Action. 
What is more, the definition of structured association provided is too broad. 
In a 2001 policy document of the European Commission with Europol Towards a European Strategy 
to Prevent Organised Crime, organised crime is defined by the presence of at least six characteristics 
out of the eleven listed. Four of them are mandatory and include:
 1.  Collaboration between more than two people; 
 2.  A prolonged or indefinite period of collaboration; 
 3.  Suspected commission of serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least 
four years or a more serious penalty; 
 4.  The goal of profit and/or power. 
The remaining two must be drawn from the last seven additional criteria:
 5.  Specialised division of labour among participants; 
 6.  Use of discipline and control; 
 7.  Employment of violence or other means of intimidation; 
 8.  Use of commercial or business-like structures;
 9.  Use of money laundering; 
 10.  Operations across national borders; 
 11.  Exercise of influence over legitimate social institutions (public figures, political parties, 
companies).
Compared to the Framework Decision, this definition attempts to identify distinguished features, in 
line with the scholarly definition.
A common definition 
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7Finally, the new Decisions on Europol and Eurojust competencies (Decision 2009/371/JHA and 
Decision 2009/426/JHA) enlarge their competencies from organised crime to “organised crime, 
terrorism and other forms of serious crime (…) affecting two or more Member States”. This leads to 
affirming (Dorn N., 2009) that, in the longer term, Europol priorities could be defined in terms of the 
seriousness of the harm to EU citizens, avoiding discussions on the boundaries of organised crime 
(how many people? Over what time period? With or without threats of violence? etc.) and giving more 
relevance to elite and corporate crime.
It is worth mentioning this evolution considering the focus of the WOC project on criminal infiltration 
in public procurement, where relationship with political elite, entrepreneurs is a distinguishable 
feature.
4. An overview on criminal infiltration in legal economy
To introduce the phenomenon of criminal infiltration in public procurement it is important to give an 
overview of the economical and financial investments of organised crime groups in legal business. 
The proceeds of illegal activities (including sexual exploitation, trafficking of weapons or drugs, 
forgery, trafficking of garbage, extortion, usury, and so on) are usually reinvested in various sectors 
of legal economy. To understand the size of this phenomenon, Italy is a paradigmatic example: 
illegal proceeds amount to about € 25.7 billion - equivalent to 1.7% of the Italian GDP (Transcrime 
and Università Cattolica di Milano, 2013, p. 2). However only between 32% and 51% of this amount 
of money (i.e. from a minimum of 8,3 to a maximum of € 13 billion) come from OC and mafia group 
activities (Transcrime and Università Cattolica di Milano, 2013, p. 2).
As a matter of fact, OC infiltration in legal economy is only one aspect of economic criminality.
Various modalities and reasons why several criminal groups infiltrate into legal economy are 
intertwined with other organisational prerogatives of modern economic crimes: 1. the so-called 
white-collar criminals who take advantage of business opportunities for money or power. They 
associate with each other for committing economic crimes or for providing illegal services to OC; 2. 
legal companies that illegally operate for achieving legal objectives. 
 
 1.  Often businessmen join with other professionals for establishing criminal organisations 
which, unlike traditional criminal groups, rarely use violence and intimidation. Such new 
organisations usually tend to use corrupt methods, abuse of power and clientelism. Moreover, 
such organisations considerably and strategically use new technologies for carrying out illegal 
activities. Frequently, white-collar criminals groups delegate their illegal activities to traditional 
OC and mafia associations. In this way, they intertwine different interests and skills (Di Nicola, 
2006, p. 88; Becchi and Rey,1994, p. 75).
 2.  Several national and international legal cases have highlighted that often legal companies utilise 
illicit tools and illegal associative forms in order to increase business competition and profits. 
False invoicing, trust companies or even false accounting are used to accumulate capital out of 
the institutional control useful, for example, to corrupt and gain economic benefits.
The mix among criminal infiltration in legal economy and other actualisation of economical criminality 
is present in all European countries (Di Nicola, 2006, p. 87-89; van Duyne, van Lampe, van Dijck and 
Newell, 2005, pp. 7-9).
The mingling of different worlds (entrepreneurial, business, political and institutional, criminal, ...) and 
various interests raise an important question: what are the factors favouring economic crimes, in 
general, and specially implementing criminal infiltration into legal business, in particular?
A key role is played by professionals specialised in economical and financial sectors who provide 
consulting services to organised crime. As well as technical skills, these experts provide criminals 
their experience in cross-border money transactions and in diversifying investments (Nelen and 
Lankhorst, 2008, p. 127). The skills required of various types of professionals differ depending on the 
illegal activities to be pursued.
Criminal infiltration 
in legal business is a 
complex phenomenon 
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8Sometimes skills in the use of computer technology are needed. In other situations, knowing 
legislations (administrative, European, of taxation, or of banking,...) and tampering with the rules are 
a must. In still other cases, a deep knowledge in financial sectors is crucial. 
The relational nexus among various professions and different types of organisations (including 
traditional criminal groups, white collars, and other legitimate economical actors) can be 
implemented in the form of complicity, cooperation or real conspiracy. These links, usually based on 
short, medium and long term agreements, can result in complex and composed scenarios. 
The intensification of relational networks between several economic subjects and criminals lead to 
the establishment of a context favourable for committing economic crimes (Di Nicola, pp. 89-91; 
Becchi and Rey, p. 94).
It is worthwhile introducing the meaning of criminal enterprise and identifying the aspects which 
distinguish and favour such enterprises in respect of legal companies. Criminal organisations often 
use techniques in company management and operate entrepreneurial activities. 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, organisational criminals have increasingly become businessmen 
establishing relationships of collusion and connivance with legal companies (Fantò, 1999, pp. 43-48; 
Arlacchi,1983, p. 109; Bini, 1997, p. 3).
Three specific profitable elements distinguish criminal enterprises from legal ones: the 
discouragement of competition using intimidation (which sometimes leads to criminal monopoly of 
particular economical sectors); the wage compression usually implemented by way of tax evasion for 
social security and the no payment of overtime; the sizeable financial liquidity originating from illegal 
activities (Arlacchi,1983, pp. 109-125).
However, it is important to underline that illegal activities are only one of many funding sources for 
criminal groups. In fact, they can have special access to the legal banking system (constituted by local 
and national lending institutions) compared to those of legal entrepreneurs (Arlacchi,1983, p.124).
Such advantages are useful indicators to identify the essential aspects of criminal enterprises. 
Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to characterise a typology of illegal companies. 
Each illicit enterprise works and operates in a particular way for facing the specific market conditions 
created by illegality. As a result, all illegal businesses differ from each other (Bini, 1997, p. 4; Fantò, 
1999, p. 78). They have variable structures and establish unstable relations with each other based on 
short-term objectives. 
The development of criminal business has not followed the licit economic growth, but it has taken 
place when illegal enterprises have begun to replace legal companies in some economic sectors 
(Arlacchi, 1983, p. 131). This process of growth is accompanied by another important aspect: the de 
facto acquisition of legal companies (or parts of them) by criminal enterprises. Some studies have 
shown that criminal groups can gradually become the owners of legal companies or control their 
activities, forcing them to accept their protection in exchange of money. The methods used to get 
control of legal companies are various (including extortion, usury, recapitalisation of firms, liquidation 
of business, ... ). The main forms of control are two: participation (when criminal groups control, for 
a short time, legal company operations in reference to a unique and specific economical sector); 
sharing (when criminals directly acquire the ownership of legal firm and manage its corporation 
stocks). This form of control is a long-lasting relation and concerns all business activities of the 
company. In the first case, the legal business remains relatively autonomous while committing illegal 
activities. On the contrary, in the second case the company changes its nature and becomes property 
of the OC (Fantò, 1999, pp. 130-150). 
Investment sectors of criminal organisations. The investment sector, ranging from the real estate 
business to various types of goods and services, is chosen according to the objectives and cultural 
motivations of each criminal group, as well as to the opportunities offered by the market and by the 
circumstantial context.
According to several authors, criminal infiltration into legal economy is such a widespread 
phenomenon that it is very difficult to identify where criminal investments occur (Fantò, 1999, p. 64).
Nevertheless, some scholars have highlighted that criminals’ investments in companies may be 
explained by five aims:
OO concealment of criminal activities (mainly money laundering);
OO control of the territory;
The choice of 
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9OO social consensus;
OO profit (and/or income) maximisation;
OO cultural/personal reasons (i.e. criminals invest in certain business because it is close to their 
culture, education background, family tradition, status and prestige) (Riccardi, 2013; Transcrime 
and Università Cattolica di Milano, 2013, p. 89).
Criminal groups focus their activities in business which let them issue false invoices and/or falsify 
accounting, hide their proceeds and conceal incoming and outgoing illicit flows. 
Concealment of criminal activities can take different forms. As well as money laundering, it can 
include transport and trade of illegal goods hidden among legal products. Such illicit operations need 
cooperation and involvement of legal enterprises. Another channel in concealing illegal profits is 
represented by cross-border money transactions which require a high level of competencies (Bini, 
1997, p. 4; Becchi and Rey, 1994, p. 93).
Control of territory and social consensus are very close aims pursued by organised criminal groups. 
They endorse organised criminals to be socially accepted in a specific territory. Criminal groups are 
thus able to control particular sectors of the local economy and/or manage the subcontracts of 
local public works, maintaining relations with suppliers, contractors, public administrators and/or 
politicians. Criminal infiltration into legal economy also allows criminals to be accepted by the lower 
citizenship groups. In fact, operating as economic actors mafia and criminal associations create jobs 
and new opportunities of life. In doing so, criminals may recruit partners from among various groups 
of society that are not fully integrated, such as ethnic minorities (Fantò, 1999; Becchi and Rey, 1994; 
Arlacchi, 1983; Allum and Gilmour, 2012, p. 93).
Furthermore, scholars have different theories concerning the economic objectives pursued by OC, 
which are mainly profit (and/or income) maximisation.
On one hand, some authors affirm that, although important, profit does not play a key role for 
decision-making in criminal and mafia groups. It is simply one aspect of the criminal groups interests, 
but not the most essential. They argue that criminal groups are aimed more at a long term revenue 
and not to a mere short-term profit (Bini , 1997). 
On the other hand, other thinkers assert that organised criminals focus their attention primarily on 
sectors with a high and immediate return on investments and with a risk minimisation (Sciarrone, 
2009, p. 102). As such, the economic field where organised crime operates is not so important 
compared to the opportunities for money laundering and profits that a certain business is allowed 
to realise. It is not by chance that criminal and mafia groups have increasingly diversified areas of 
investments and overtaken the entrepreneurial monoculture typical of criminal organisations. The 
latter, until the 1960s and 1970s, were almost exclusively concentrated in real estate and public 
works. These areas, although still preferred by criminal groups, were gradually joined with other 
economic fields, especially in public services (mainly healthcare, private clinics, the treatment of 
urban and toxic waste). As such, various criminal groups gradually inserted themselves in each field 
of economical and financial activity (Fantò, 1999, pp. 63-66).
Organised criminals select economical sectors for their activities on the basis of both their specific 
aims and the attractive opportunities offered.
Independently of the investment sector, criminal infiltration into legal economy produces significant 
economic and social costs due to the alteration of the competitive rules of the market and placement 
of illegal proceeds into legal business (for an in-depth analysis, see EU Parliament (a) 2013; UNODC, 
2011, cap 3; Bertoni and Rossi, 1997, p. 36).
5. OC modus operandi to infiltrate public procurement
Criminal groups are involved to some degree in different types of illegal activities, among which the 
exploitation of legal economy opportunities is growing in importance. In particular, the opportunities 
given by the public works sector represent a new area of investment for criminal groups. Although 
systematic analyses on this specific area do not exist, the reasons for choosing this sector, the 
strategies and methods used by criminal groups can be figured out by the analysis of the literature 
and reports of national and international institutions.
Profit maximisation 
is just one of the OC 
aims
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Reasons of public procurements choice. Various reasons exist why criminal groups and the mafia 
choose the public works sector, in particular public procurements. The first reason is economic: the 
expense for public contracts is a great part of territorial economy especially where the private sector 
is underdeveloped. The second is linked to the investigative judicial penal sector: investigations of 
criminal activity within public contracts are difficult to carry out and very costly in terms of procedure 
and personnel. Crimes committed in the public sector are harder to detect and to prove compared 
to other ones like, for example, trafficking, etc. The third reason is linked to the weaknesses and 
inefficiencies of public administration. Especially in certain countries, like Italy, during the years the 
public contract sector has revealed its vulnerability to corruption and collusion episodes (Calderoni 
and Caneppele, 2009, pp. 7-8; CNEL, 2008, p. 11). And finally, criminal infiltration has strategic 
importance as a means of territorial control in the penetration of social, economic and institutional 
structures of the territory. In fact, certain businesses and sectors (such as restaurants, supplies, 
construction) can be used both for maximising physical control on the territory and for strengthening 
the relationships with politicians and public administrators (Riccardi, 2013, pp. 198-199).
Channels for exercising influence and for infiltrating public contracts. Analysing the literature and 
various institutional reports, it is possible to hypothesise that OC groups mainly use two channels 
for infiltrating public works and public contracts: (a) direct infiltration in the public process of bidding 
through the direct control of private companies i.e. through the use of name and/or members of 
criminal family; (b) indirect actions where the OC acts as a mediator among companies, politicians and 
public administration using relational networking, persuasion, or even intimidation. This is the case 
of the agreements between the criminal exponents and the entrepreneurs, political, institutional and 
public representatives in order to assure their desired motive. These channels are context-specific. 
OC groups’ behaviour changes according to the characteristics of their own structure and abilities, 
the features of the market and the opportunity of the moment.
The choice of such channels depend not only on the objectives of criminal groups and on the context, 
but also on the phase of the public procurement process in which criminals want to infiltrate.
A public procurement process can be divided into three main phases summarised in the following table.
Phases of public procurement 
and work execution
Steps of the public procurement 
process
Activities of the companies
1. Pre-tender stage Allocation of public funds Lobbying
Choice of the tender procedure - -
Writing of public bidding and tender 
specifications 
- -
Publication of the tender documents - -
2. Tender stage Designation of the evaluation board - -
Selection procedure Submission of application
Provisional award
Final award
Signature of the contract
3. Post-award stage Starting work Employment of manpower; 
acquisition of everything needed to 
carry out work (materials, services, 
etc.); awarding subcontracts
Control and work-in-progress 
inspection; audit
Public work conclusion
Testing
End of the administrative Procedure
* The table is the result of a joint work between Valeria Ferraris and Caterina Mazza.
Why criminal groups 
choose public 
procurement and how 
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The first two stages are part of the procedures aimed at the definition of public funds available and 
the selection of firms. These phases give opportunities to criminals for influencing the allocation of 
public money process. 
The third stage is linked to the post-bidding moment when the public work has already been awarded. 
This phase is particularly attractive for criminal groups in so far it allows to control the building site for 
gaining several advantages. The post-bidding protection on site can be agreed upon by both sides or 
forcefully reckoned where payment is based on a percentage of the total public work fee (Calderoni 
and Caneppele, 2009, p. 8 e pp. 63-65; DNA, 2007; EU Parliament, 2012, p. 15, AA.VV., 2012). South 
Italy is a good example where infiltration frequently occurs in the post-bidding phase. The mafia clans/
families oblige entrepreneurs through intimidation and/or agreement to pay bribes in exchange for 
protection of building site, they force sub-contract and/or control material acquisition and human 
resources. The major sectors in the post-bidding phase infiltration are linked to infrastructures in the 
sector of - Viability, Transport, Waste, Environmental Defense - (CNEL, 2008, p. 40).
Methods used by organised criminal groups. The practices used to tamper with the procedures for 
the execution of public contacts are various:
a. Collusion/Partnership relations. These practices move from relatively simple agreement 
between two or more participants in the public bidding to more complex methods (e.g. the creation 
of networks to control the allocation of public funds which involve politicians and high-level public 
officers who return favours to the OC in exchanges for votes, protection, etc.)
One of the most sophisticated methods is the partnership between criminals and legal market 
entrepreneurs. It is called metodo del tavolino, where companies linked to criminal and mafia groups 
participate in the bidding process for allocating public procurements using falsifications. This method 
is most frequently used when the public procurement procedure considers the lowest bid auction 
system as a selection criterion. In this case the contracting authority and/or commissioning body are 
usually accomplices. 
Another kind of scheme to infiltrate bidding procedures is the Cartel agreement. It consists in the 
networking of companies which take part together in the same bidding process, harmonising illegally 
their bids, in order to allocate the public contract to one of them. These more complex agreements 
can be made with the mediation and coordination of OC groups. These kinds of pacts work where 
mafia and criminal groups are more entrenched and infiltrated in various sectors of society. They are 
typical of South Italy during the nineties and during the following years, with particular reference to 
infrastructure biddings (Vannucci, 2006; Calderoni and Caneppele, 2009, pp. 82-84; EU Parliament 
(b), 2013; Varese, 2011; DNA, 2007; DNA, 2014).
The mentioned cases are based on collusive relations which can take place among bidders (as in the 
case of Cartel agreement), not necessarily linked to criminal groups, or among bidders and politicians 
and/or public officials (who can include criminals), or among all subjects involved in a public 
procurement (including the contracting authority).
b. Corruption. Corruption is used in public procurement in order to obtain the award of a contract 
in each kind of bidding procedure (from the close procedure to the competitive dialogue) and of its 
phase (starting from the allocation of funds and the preparation of the tender to the final award). 
Bribes are mainly used to influence the discretional decisions; to obtain classified information and 
acquire political and institutional protection (Vannucci, 2005, p. 82; EU Parliament, 2012, pp. 7-9).
Influencing the allocation of funds or posting a public work increase the chance of a specific company 
to obtain the work, because the corrupt public official will use his/her power to help the bidder in 
exchange for a bribe. Then, too, private corrupt entrepreneurs can increase their own chances of 
success simply through the foreknowledge of administrative practices and timing or of institutional 
decisions or the bids by other competitors. The trading of technical or commercial information 
on bids can take place directly between a private entrepreneur and a public official, or with the 
mediation of intermediaries (Andvig, 2012, p. 77.; Vannucci, 2005, p. 87).
The third means or resource (i.e. political and institutional protection) is a complex kind of corruption. 
The uncertainty of the outcome of biddings or of the corruptive relationships with public administrators 
can be diminished by the protection of politicians or public administrators or powerful persons. These 
power figures can have long-term control on the decisional centres or can have long-lasting influence 
on individual administrative agents (Vannucci, 2005, p.92; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1994; Nelen, 2013).
The public 
procurement process
Three are the main 
methods used by 
criminal groups: 
collusion, corruption 
and coercion
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Between the third type of corrupt methods and the collusive practices there is a thin difference. 
The two are very similar, but corruption aimed at political and institutional protection takes place in 
a discontinuing way, and only when advantageous. In this case the exchange of bribes and favours 
is simultaneous. So, all subjects involved in this relation are satisfied at the same time. Instead, 
collusion among criminals and public servants is usually part of long-term and continuative relations. 
The advantages are received differently by each actor over time.
Along with corruption are fraudulent practices, such as misrepresentation or omission of facts or 
documents aimed at influencing a selection process or the execution of a contract.
It is important to say that corrupt forms are not used exclusively by criminal groups, but they can be 
used by entrepreneurs without links with OC.
 
c. Coercion. It includes practices such as extortions, intimidations, threats, blackmails. OC uses such 
methods when it is necessary to force entrepreneurs, businessmen, public administrators to be 
compliant or collaborative in achieving the goals of the criminal group within itself, influencing their 
participation in the procurement process, or affecting the execution of a contract (EU Parliament (b), 
2013, pp. 2-3).
The various methods pointed out are usually implemented together in a combined and/or 
simultaneous way. The crimes are often melded and used to affect one another (e.g. public bidding 
infiltration is used not only for obtaining power or money, but also for money laundering). 
The operational methods, like the channels for infiltrating public procurement, are chosen 
considering two important elements:
(a)   the reasons why a criminal group determines to illegally compete in a public bidding (e.g. if an 
OC group aims for territorial control and/or to infiltrate the socio-political context, the methods 
more often used are collusive practices and/or the creation -or exploitation- of relational 
networks among politicians, entrepreneurs, public officials, and so on. In such cases, the 
infiltration channel is on the level of indirect actions of mediation);
(b)  the context where OC acts. Criminal groups always interact with their environment and use local 
opportunities. Where a criminal organisation is well-entrenched, the methods frequently used 
are collusive practices. On the contrary, where an OC organisation is less entrenched, coercive 
methods, such as extortion and intimidation, are more frequent (Sciarrone, 2014; Armao, 2014; 
Allum and Sands, 2004). The mixture of various elements bring different levels of criminal 
infiltration into the public sector by OC. According to Buscaglia e van Dijk, five infiltrating levels 
can be identified: corruption and abuse of authority; gradual control of the public contracting 
agencies management; affecting State’s policies (Buscaglia e van Dijk, 2005).
Difference between national and transnational public procurements exists. As evidence has shown, 
the domestic and cross-border public procurement are basically different only for the jurisdictional 
conflicts which characterise the second ones and which give numerous opportunities to organised 
criminals. The dissimilarities among national legislations, as well as the problematic investigative and 
judicial cooperation among States, give considerable advantages to criminals for minimising risks 
of their identification, arrest and conviction. The elements potentially increasing risks of criminal 
infiltration into transnational public works are: problems of international collaboration among police 
and judicial authorities; lack of information exchanges; incrimination procedures too long and slow; 
training courses for police agents too expansive (see, Di Nicola, 2006, p. 100). In this perspective, 
several criminal and mafia organisations have a transnational nature. They operate in various 
countries acquiring the ability to adapt in new contexts and to tamper with laws.
6. OC and corruption
The OC modus operandi in exploiting public procurement suggests adding some consideration to the 
links between organised crime and corruption.
This connection is very little explored by scholars and political advisers, even though the 
understanding of these links seem relevant to identify an effective counter-strategy.
The specificity of 
transnational public 
procurement
Organised crime 
and corruption are 
interrelated and 
intertwined
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The lack of attention is due to several reasons: lack of appropriate awareness of the relationships 
between the two, disciplinary segmentation of scholars and policy makers, difficulties in defining 
organized crime.
Despite that, some academics and EU institutions highlight the importance of the link between 
corruption and OC, often co-existing and interacting when advantageous (Buscaglia and van Dijk, 
2005; Gounev and Ruggiero, 2014; Europol, 2009). 
Although these two distinctive crimes are not necessarily interrelated, in case of criminal infiltration 
in public procurements they could be interconnected. In general terms, corruption (both in the public 
and in the private sector) represents an opportunity for the international criminal networks because 
it eases criminal activities, both in the legal and illegal markets. Some countries have structural 
conditions that favour the use of corruptive practices from criminal organisations.
Feeble judicial and police systems, lack of governance of the private sector, including the financial 
one, represent factors that favour the links between corruption and organised crime. Moreover 
where greater is the underground economy, more are the opportunities to use money for corruption.
In the private sector, corruption is used by criminal organisations to distort markets or increase 
profits. For example, corruption of employees in the pharmaceutical, tobacco, and fashion industries 
allow the production of goods for illegal markets. Similarly, in ports and airports corruption of 
security officers can facilitate the transportation of illegal goods. In the finance and banking sector, 
corruption of employees is aimed at money laundering and avoiding reporting suspect transactions 
as they should.
The corruption of public servants is aimed at obtaining favours: the access to certain markets, the 
illegitimate appropriation of public funds or other resources, the allocation of public biddings or the 
lessening of the risk of being prosecuted. When the corruption is systemic, it is incorporated within 
the socio-political system and its aims are far beyond obtaining specific concrete results.
In order to influence the public procurement sector, the use of corruptive practices in the public 
sector is frequent as well as corruption in the private one. To give some examples:
 1.  Corruption of employees of other companies is aimed at reducing competition, supplying goods 
at better price, etc.;
 2.  Collusion or cartel agreements are aimed at excluding other companies from the competition; 
 3.  Corruption of politicians or administrative staff is aimed at obtaining new contracts
7. Conclusions
It is beyond the purpose of this study to resolve the academic dispute on the definition of organised 
crime (see Vander Beken, 2012 on the many faces of organised crime and Dorn, 2009 who claims 
for the end of organised crime), but we need to reach a common understanding on this issue for 
implementing the analysis on criminal infiltration in public procurement and the forthcoming 
comparative research.
No matter which definition has been used by scholars, the organisational structure and the criminal 
activities are always described as fundamental elements of organised crime. These two aspects, 
included in all theoretical OC definitions, change over time in relation to the specific focus of different 
academics and to the context. So, we have taken into account these two elements, variously 
considered, as part of our research issue.
Examining the phenomenon of criminal infiltration in legal economy and specifically in public 
procurement, other two essential aspects came to light. The former is that these crimes cause 
serious damages. In fact, such crimes threaten fair competition among companies, increase the 
costs of public works, affect national GDP and jeopardise economic investments in the country. 
Among the factors that favour economic crimes, the involvement of professionals in economic and 
financial sectors who provide consulting services to criminals plays a key role. Moreover, alliances 
and/or collusive relations or connivances with entrepreneurs, politicians, public administrators, 
make criminals more and more able to infiltrate the public sector. As a result, the relational 
networks among different actors part of both the legal and illegal world are an essential basis of the 
phenomenon.
In public procurement 
corruption in private 
and public sectors are 
both used
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The two aspects just mentioned are recurring elements which characterise the criminal infiltration in 
public procurement issue everywhere it takes place.
Then, too, the channels (direct and/or indirect) and the methods (collusive practices/Partnership 
relations; corruption and fraudulent practices; coercive practices) for allocating public funds are 
chosen by various organised crime groups in relations to their specific aims and abilities, and to the 
opportunities of the moment and of the context.
In conclusion, all the features identified have to be considered as common points of reference for the 
present study instead of a specific definition, which would too rigid and misleading.
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